How the Chinese government spreads global authoritarianism

On the 17th March 2018, the Chinese president was sitting with his back to his party delegates, about to undertake the most important action of his entire life. 

He got up from his red chair, walked slowly across the red carpet, with red flags towering over him, and carefully placed two red pieces of paper into a polished red box. Accompanied with melodic applause and marching music, he quickly looked up at the crowd of photographers, gave them his characteristic half-smile half-grimace, and returned to his seat. 

His red papers would be followed by thousands of others, men dressed mostly in black suits with grey ties, some wearing traditional minority clothing, often followed by a nervous bow or a nod to the cameras. The result was announced a few hours later, with 2,958 for, two against, and four abstentions. And with that Xi Jinping became China’s first president for life, effective immediately, at a congressional session where most had been expecting him to announce his successor. 

At the same congress, Xi announced that China’s development offered a “new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence, ” and that “it is time for us to take centre stage in the world, and make a greater contribution to humankind”. 

Indeed, the rest of the world was about to find out what that greater contribution to the world would be. 2018 will be remembered as a turning point in Chinese history, for the next two years would show that Xi’s words were more than just political theatre. 

In the last few years as part of Xi’s power play, China has moved from being an authoritarian state primarily concerned with building internal stability, to one that is now actively exporting authoritarianism on the world stage. This includes a coordinated strategy on almost every front, including economic, technological, military, and political. 

Just like the Soviet Union exported its political model providing military and economic assistance to other communist countries, Xi’s China is using economic and technological aid to prop up and strengthen autocracies across the globe. In doing so it has become one of the biggest barriers to the spread of democratic values. 

If liberal and democratic systems are to succeed, it is essential to understand the nature of this threat, and how the world should respond to it. To do so, we need to examine how the Chinese authoritarian model has developed, and how it now operates. 

only when the country is strong

In 1999 — When Xi was just a provincial governor — five GPS guided missiles fired from US B-2 stealth bombers were fired at what was supposed to be a Serbian arms trading outfit, but instead turned out to be the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. 

The NATO intervention against Slobodan Milosovec’s forces in Yugoslavia had authorised US bombers to destroy Serbian military targets. The resulting explosions killed three Chinese citizens and seriously injured twenty more. 

This diplomatic disaster brought considerable tensions between the two countries, with China rejecting the US government’s explanation that the targeted sites were based on an outdated map. They said that the US’s actions were nothing more than “gunboat diplomacy” designed to intimidate and provoke China. Tensions were not helped by a report that alleged the embassy had been targeted because it had been found providing coordination and assistance to the Serbian military. 

Deliberate or not, the bombing caused mass protests among nationalists in China, with pressure on the government to respond with force. Instead of giving in to the pressure however, president Jiang Zemin and his foreign minister repeatedly expressed that any retaliation would harm China’s ability to build up its power. 

“We must not enter into frontal military conflict with the United States”, Warned the foreign minister. “Only when the country is prosperous and strong will we have the strength to back our words with actions”. 

The Chinese government was here repeating a policy formulated by previous leaders that China should “avoid the limelight” on the world stage, until it was strong enough to face down military threats. A lesson which had been learned after the many conflicts that Chairman Mao’s leadership had embroiled the country in. 

China, like the Soviet Union, had funded and armed communist revolutionary groups all over the world. Providing support to armed insurgents in Thailand, Malaysia, India, Burma, Angola, and the Congo.

Maoist theories of a communist revolution led by peasants had inspired uprisings as far afield as Peru and Palestine, and the Chairman himself was only too eager to lend his support. During the cultural revolution the country adopted a much more aggressive foreign policy, starting conflicts with India, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. 

After Mao died the policy of exporting global revolution became something of an embarrassment to the Chinese Communist Party, and the country instead adopted a view of minimal interference in foreign affairs and an emphasis on stability at all costs. 

This was most evident when civil war broke out in Nepal in 1996 after bands of revolutionary Maoists rose up against a corrupt royal family. Rather than supporting the Maoist rebels, China instead condemned them for “misusing the Chairman’s good name” and even supplied the Nepalese government with weapons in 2005, proving that Maoism in China had indeed been supplanted by a more pragmatic ideology. 

Such carefulness didn’t stop China from occasionally lashing out in nationalist fury however. In 1996 — angered by Taiwan’s first democratic elections — China’s military fired scores of missiles into the Taiwan straits in an attempt to intimidate the newest Asian democracy. The US responded by sending its navy to accompany the Taiwan fleet, forcing the missiles to stop.  The incident was an embarrassment for China and forced it to acknowledge that they could not stop the US military from aiding Taiwan. 

During the 2000s, China’s policy became one of using international institutions to safeguard its financial investments. Many of which were in Africa. Unlike the Western powers, China had no qualms about dealing with any dictators they found there and were happy to pursue investments in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Sudan. As part of this strategy, China vastly increased its military contribution in the UN, specifically using them to combat rebels in Sudan, and to police pirate operations near Somalia. Rather than waste time with ceasefires and human rights concerns, China was eager for any rebels to be quickly crushed, lest they disrupt investment opportunities.

China was however still willing to use covert tactics to play power games, they supported the NATO intervention in Afghanistan for example but were later found arming the Taliban in 2007.

This same dynamic of stability first played out in Sri Lanka in 2009, where after years of ceasefires, the impatient Chinese pressured their ally Pakistan to supply the government with the weapons they needed to finally wipe out the Tamil tigers and put an end to the conflict. 

This more careful, and stability oriented approach would change in the 2010s, after Xi came into power, and once China grew in confidence about its relative strength. Under Xi’s tenure-ship the country would change from being a quiet goods manufacturer, to the world’s biggest authoritarian influencer. 

taking the centre stage

In the 2010s at first the CCP by and large kept to its principles of keeping a low profile and maintaining stability. The government resolutely refused to intervene when a coup in neighbouring Kazakhstan threatened regional interests. They also pledged Chinese UN troops to support the French during the 2012 invasion of Mali to protect business ties maintaining that Chinese troops deployments would remain under the banner of international organisations.

As Xi was assuming office however, this non interference policy would soon be under strain in areas deemed to be part of China’s national interest, specifically in the South China Sea. 

In 2012 China effectively annexed the Scarborough Shoal Islands from the Philippines by first occupying it with militarised fishing vessels, and then refusing to comply with a UN mandated mutual withdrawal despite international courts ruling against them. 

Later in the same year the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the Senkaku Islands from its private owner triggered mass protests all over China that included the wrecking of Japanese cars, stores, and violence against Japanese nationals. The government responded by attempting to establish air dominance over the region to little effect. 

Other signs that the avoiding-the-limelight days were nearing their end came from reports that China sent its special forces into Syria in 2015 to combat Uiyghurs who were fighting alongside the rebels.

This period also saw increasing cooperation between China and Iran. China had helped Iran develop its nuclear program in the 1990s and became its largest trading partner in the 2000s. A 2016 US subpoena alleged that Huawei had been using proxy companies to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars into Iran — violating sanctions — and also deliver stolen US technology to Iran, North Korea, and Syria. 

Further excursions would soon follow. The PLA armed and trained militia groups during the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar in 2017. In the same year it gave millions of dollars worth of weapons freely to the Philippines to crackdown on the insurgency in Marawi. All seemed to point to Beijing becoming less and less shy about using military power to secure its interests. 

All of this was in part a build up to Xi Jinping’s takeover of the party in 2018. His newly outlined policies of making China a world leader in key technologies like energy, biotech, and AI, also included a military strategic dimension. The Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei’s 5G roll out, were both part of a new strategy to use China’s vast resources to make it the global standard in key industries. 

The foreign minister in 1999 had stated that only when China was strong would they have the power to “back our words with actions”. In Xi’s opinion that time had clearly now arrived. 

the people have sharp eyes

Xi’s 2018 party takeover was not only part of a strategy to secure political control. It also involved exporting China’s political system using technology specifically designed for dictatorships. 

To see the system China is now spreading around the world, one only has to look to neighbouring countries that fall within its sphere of influence. Central Asia is becoming a model for a global Chinese style authoritarianism as the technologies and policies that were used on the Uyghurs in Xinjiang are being exported there. 

As well as the social credit system — that is used to target people who exhibit anti social behaviour or political dissidents — the CCP has rolled out its AI driven surveillance program that links tens of millions of CCTV cameras across china with footage from smartphones and smart TVs. Known as the ‘sharp eyes’ program it coordinates data from online messaging, GPS travel data, purchasing history, and filters it all with AI recognition software. 

China is currently seeking to export its social credit system to Kazakhstan by next year, and has already installed Huawei surveillance technology in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, something that the Huawei representative there tellingly said was a prerequisite for Chinese investment. This technology has also accompanied increasing arms sales to the Central Asian governments and donations of militarised police equipment. 

The same surveillance technology was also sold to Ethiopia and Zimbabwe under the umbrella of BRI, and last year Huawei engineers helped the Ugandan government hack Whatsapp to arrest opposition leaders.

China’s influence in Africa extends far beyond technology sales. Officials there routinely use bribes and intimidation to secure business contracts even on the leaders of African countries. The Chinese government was found spying on the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia and has recently pledged to fund the African Standby Force to the tune of $100 million. 

There are other worrying signs that the CCP is willing to go beyond financial leverage in Africa. Before the coup in Zimbabwe that ousted Robert Mugabe, his vice president Mnangawa fled to China in November 2017, met with military officials, and then returned to Zimbabwe and took over the government using several Chinese military vehicles that no one had seen before. This spread alarm over China’s involvement in the coup as they had already criticised Mugabe because of his nationalisation of Chinese-owned diamond mines. 

In South America China has also extended its influence, supplying surveillance technology and aid to the government in Ecuador, and propping up the Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela with funding and technological assistance. In total 18 countries are known to be using Chinese facial recognition AI with many more suspected to be developing it.

The true extent of China’s political manipulation was seen in 2018 when it garnered signatures from 37 countries to support its policy of incarcerating more than a million peaceful muslims in Xinjiang. Most of the countries supporting China were themselves dictatorships and — tellingly — almost all had previously signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative. Only Turkey and Malaysia later broke ranks and criticised China after it used its influence to extradite ethnic uighurs from countries as far away as Egypt.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan openly replied — when asked about his country’s support by a Turkish Journalist — that he was unable to challenge China because of the amount of economic support they had lent his country. One has to at least give him credit for honesty. Both governments have since acknowledged that the Pakistan economic corridor will be used to refuel Chinese fighter jets. 

Pakistan is just one example of China’s new military ambitions. After Xi’s power play, the country built seven militarised artificial islands in the South China Sea, opened a military base in Djibouti, and has since been found building military bases in Cambodia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, with several more being considered. 

If one wants to find a model for a modern Chinese satellite state, one need look no further than Cambodia, a country which now resembles something akin to a tributary state of an ancient Chinese dynasty. The story of how China came to own the country is an interesting one. Hun Sen, the country’s present leader, lost the 1993 national election but was allowed to become Prime Minister as part of a coalition government. In 1996 he was invited to Beijing where he signed several trade deals and was given promises of political support. He then returned to his country and — backed by Chinese money — ousted the majority party and took over the government. Since then Cambodia has remained a puppet state, repeatedly blocking ASEAN condemnations of China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, and receiving $5.3 billion in funding from China between 2013 and 2017. In 2018 the Cambodian government completely outlawed its opposition party and — with the help of Chinese cyber attacks — placed most of its leaders in prison. When the coronavirus broke out in China, Hun Sen immediately flew to visit Xi Jinping and declared that Cambodians would not wear masks as they had nothing to fear from the virus, and that his country’s borders would remain completely open.

Cambodia is the model for what China would like to create for every country. An authoritarian dictatorship that imprisons dissidents and serves Chinese business and political interests. The strategy is essentially to offer developing countries a way to rapidly grow their economies based on cheap loans and infrastructure. And to offer the ruling autocrats protection in the form of financial backing and advanced technology. In return the CCP demands silence over their human rights abuses, supporting Chinese business interests, and non alliance with democratic nations. This however can only appeal to autocratic countries with very corrupt political institutions whose interest is primarily in expanding their power base and not representing their citizens. Recent events have shown that it is much more difficult for China to influence countries where well functioning democratic systems are already in place. 

disinformation warfare

The strategy towards developed countries is instead one of espionage, financial pressure, and soft power. China’s political subversion campaigns in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia were revealed by the Chinese spy Wang Liqiang who defected to the Australian government in November last year. There have also been massive bribery campaigns directed towards politicians in Germany. These campaigns have however been very unsuccessful, as recent elections in Hong Kong and Taiwan have gone overwhelmingly against the CCP. 

Elsewhere the government routinely uses espionage to steal Western technology and uses it to aid their authoritarian politics. Recent reports from the US and UK have warned of a global Chinese cyber-warfare campaign that targeted at least 45 companies and over 100,00 individuals. Most people have heard of China’s Great Firewall, a euphemism for the gigantic government project that censors thousands of foreign websites. Less people know about the Great Cannon, a government offensive cyber weapon which has been used to attack foreign websites critical of their policies.

Many Chinese students have also often been employed by their government to steal western technology leading to dozens being arrested. As alarming as these subversion campaigns are, what is arguably of more concern is the amount of financial leverage that China is able to exercise over Western companies. Massive corporations like Mercedes, Apple and Nike have been forced to censor symbols or slogans considered to be politically sensitive in China, and Hollywood movies are now often forced to do likewise. 

Perhaps most worrying of all is the creation of a new axis of authoritarian powers that are aligned against democratic nations. China, Russia, and Iran have been deepening economic and financial ties for some time now. In 2019 the three held their first joint military exercises, deploying masses of armed frigates in the Gulf of Oman in response to the growing tensions in the region. 

But despite the unprecedented threat that is presented by these actions. It’s also important to recognise the limitations of China’s strategy. In the last year alone Xi has seen many mounting challenges to his grand plan and what the country’s future foreign policy will be depends largely on its internal politics.

the red dynasty 

Even before the coronavirus broke out, the Chinese economy was reportedly in much worse condition than the government had reported, meaning that Xi’s state investments are rather limited. His planned BRI projects have barely gotten started, and corruption in authoritarian countries means investors have a difficult time making money there.

His attempted expansion of China’s political influence in the world has accompanied a propaganda effort including advertisements, training media operatives, and promoting Chinese culture using tools like the Confucius institute. These operations have not been very successful, as public opinion of China has plummeted because of China’s recent actions on the world stage. 

The economic decoupling of Western economies from China will be accelerated due to the virus but we should recognise that the main threat the world faces from Beijing is not economic, but ideological. The country has created a sphere of influence based on authoritarian economic development and will expand it given the chance. 

As Xi finds himself implicated in the biggest man-made disaster in modern history, it may be dawning on him that his grand political strategy has run out of steam before it really got started. Whenever the man himself smiles he often still manages to look dissatisfied. The moment when he voted to make himself president for life in 2018, was one of the few times he looked genuinely happy. Now that same congress is closed even as China pretends to the world that it’s open for business. Instead of sitting in a red room full of cheering subordinates he is now pictured alone, on a chair outdoors. He has been relegated to the background, appearing only a few times during the corona-crisis that is almost entirely of his own making. One can’t help think when comparing him to his height of power in 2018, that his political triumph has receded almost as quickly as it emerged. 

The next few years will decide whether Xi and his strand of politics is able to survive the political turmoil that is now engulfing China, and whether this new, nationalist and confrontational approach is here to stay, or just a passing political phenomenon.

John Martin

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