Xi Jinping’s rise to power in the Chinese Communist Party
‘This is the greatest crisis facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since Tiananmen Square’ is a statement that one hears after almost every scandal in China, and eventually starts to sound like a cliché. But the obvious thing to point out is, at some point, there must be a crisis that warrants the comparison. And it’s hard to think of a better equivalent than coronavirus. I believe this is the greatest challenge the party has faced this century, and how the party will look when it emerges is one of the most important questions not only for China’s, but the world’s future.
The current political infighting that has embroiled the party has its origins in the type of politics developed during Xi Jinping’s time as leader. How the party got to this stage is a fascinating insight into the nature of one-party rule and the conflicts such a system creates.
Firstly, Xi himself owes his position to a round of political infighting that took place in the previous generation of China’s leaders, and the ensuing conflict was one of the main reasons he adopted his calculating style.
The Chinese leadership in the late 2000s was split between then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, and the previous president, Jiang Zemin, who had formally stepped down in 2002.
Under Jiang, China had embarked on its ambitious financial reform and privatization of the late 90s and entered the World Trade Organisation, paving the way for years of record-breaking economic growth. Hu had inherited a much richer country, but one that by the mid-2000s was becoming one of the most unequal in the world. Hu’s second term was coming up quickly which meant a new successor would have to be found who was not too old but still had the experience to run the party.
The ensuing political battle saw the factions of the two leaders pitted against each other. Jiang’s group is known as the Shanghai Clique because of the development policies he oversaw there. Hu’s group is the Youth League, because of the time he spent as leader of the department. Jiang and the Shanghai Clique wanted a candidate that would create further economic growth, whereas Hu and the Youth League wanted one that would focus on stabilisation.
Corruption at the time was becoming one of China’s foremost issues. With the rise of the internet, it became harder for the CCP to conceal scandals of corrupt officials. One example was the ‘Li Gang Incident’, where a drunk driver ran down two students in Hubei province and told the arriving police: “Go ahead, sue me if you dare, my father is Li Gang!” Li Gang was later found to be the director of the local security bureau. Netizens were — needless to say — unhappy about this. “Wo ba shi li gang” (my father is Li Gang) became an internet slogan used to highlight corruption.
President Hu’s choice of successor was Li Keqiang — now China’s Premiere — as the two had both led the Youth League. Jiang’s choice was a former Shanghai mayor called Chen Liangyu.
Because Jiang had bought allegiance from most of his supporters by bribing them, Hu cleverly anticipated some foul play and decided to investigate Mayor Chen. Sure enough, the mayor was found to have embezzled more than $1.25 billion from Shanghai’s social security fund.
With his prime candidate now in prison, Jiang and the Shanghai Clique instead turned towards an ambitious reformer called Bo Xilai, mayor of Chongqing which at the time was one of China’s major industrial centres. Bo was known for his creation of a ‘red culture’ movement which aimed to take down the ‘black’ mafia but actually simply took its money and deposited the cash in Bo’s private accounts.
Largely because of his attempted Maoist revival, Bo had little support among the party to be the next leader, denying Bo promises of power. That would later come back to haunt the party leaders.
Xi Jinping had risen through the ranks quickly, and made a name for himself as being especially tough on corruption in Zhijiang. This was a farce, as Xi had in fact presided over a multibillion-dollar smuggling ring in Xiamen in the late 90s. Apart from him, there were few other candidates who had both the age requirements and the experience, and he was settled on as a compromise between Hu and Jiang, a moderator between the two factions because neither wanted to nominate the others’ candidate.
But just as Xi was being groomed to take over the leadership, the party found that a new faction had formed around Bo Xilai, supported by the Shanghai Clique, which felt it had been cheated by the nomination of Xi and wanted to carve out power for itself.
The full nature of the plot would come to light after the death of a British businessman in Chongqing in 2011. Neil Heywood was a middleman for the Bo family, and had managed their business assets abroad. Failing to negotiate a higher commission for his services, he then threatened to reveal the family’s undeclared assets to the Chinese government. Bo Xilai’s wife responded by having him poisoned in a hotel room. This would have been a job well done, if Bo’s vice-mayor had not fled to the US consulate and revealed all after stealing millions of dollars for himself.
This created a problem for the leadership, because the Western media now knew about the whole affair. They called a meeting in March 2012 and decided that Bo had to be taken down. He was placed under house arrest shortly after.
The conspiracy would not end there, however, as it became apparent that Bo had created a network around him with similar promises of political power. Specifically, Bo had on his side the head of the secret police, Zhou Yongkang, who headed the 610 office which executed thousands of Falun Gong Practitioners in the late 90s.
As chief of secret police, Zhou had files on every corrupt CCP official in the country. The plan was reportedly to use them to guarantee Zhou and Bo a seat at the next politburo. He enlisted the help of the Discipline Office director, whose son had just been found dead in a crashed Ferrari surrounded by naked prostitutes. In exchange for covering up this embarrassing incident, Zhou wanted his support, and together they formed an alliance with several military officials.
After the poisoning came to light and Bo went down for it, these plans went out the window. Zhou and his gang suddenly found themselves in a cat-and-mouse game with the party leaders.
Things came to a head in March 2012 a few days after the downfall of Bo, when a middleman with knowledge of Zhou and Bo’s dealings was detained in Beijing. Zhou entered the city with his armed police to take the witness back by force.
Hu Jintao called the military into Beijing to apprehend Zhou, and after a standoff where the police fired warning shots in the air, they disarmed. Zhou managed to escape through an underground tunnel in Zhongnanhai.
Thereafter Zhou was stripped from all his positions in the party, but not actually tried. The reason was that he and his faction were still being sheltered by former president Jiang Zemin and the Shanghai Clique. Zhou had managed to build up a base of support within the military, and spent the next few months in his private residences. This period saw a campaign where there were a total of six attempts on Xi Jinping’s life in late 2012, forcing him to disappear for two weeks.
In 2013, the CCP formally tried Bo Xilai and gave the approval to arrest and prosecute Zhou Yongkang for corruption. He then emerged after days in detention a lot thinner with his hair completely white and confessed crimes of corruption to the party.
But even with Zhou out the way, there still remained a vast political network working against Xi. In the month’s following Bo’s public confession, the group launched a series of political attacks against the president from inside the party, ranging from exposes of corruption within his family to a hacking campaign. This was when Xi gave the ‘tigers and flies’ speech where he said his anti-corruption campaign had reached a stalemate and that he was willing to give his life to see it through.
2014 would see the final phase of the take-down of Zhou’s patronage gang. Through Ling Jihua, Zhou had formed a vast network of supporters known as the ‘Xishan Society’ (West Mountain Society), a secret group that guaranteed political favours and operated in Shanxi province — China’s coal country. Its members were mainly from the Youth League. In August, Xi finally managed to politically surround the society and imprison a staggering 15,000 party officials.
Later that year the military general, Xu Caihou, who had allegedly conspired with Bo and Zhou, was formally put under investigation for corruption. Another general, Guo Boxiong, followed him in 2015. In the same year Xi purged the entire Chinese military, removing more than 300,000 members, most of whom were part of Jiang Zemin’s remaining faction.
Chinese state media after the arrest of the conspirators claimed that Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkan, Ling Jihua, and Xu Caihou together had formed a ‘new Gang of Four’ after the Gang of Four led by Mao’s wife during the Cultural Revolution that had overseen mass political purges.
The final purge of Jiang’s faction from the party in 2015 represents Xi’s consolidation of power within the CCP, the end of the first phase of his anti-corruption campaign. With it, both the Shanghai Clique and Youth League factions which first nominated Xi had been brought to their knees.
The second phase of his campaign would see its expansion into the legal system, finance, and civil society, and set the stage for his final takeover of the party in 2018.
Tigers and Flies
On June 12th, 2015, the popping of a stock market bubble began, and, in August, the Shanghai stock market saw its worst single-day fall since 2008.
The crash was a serious challenge to the party leadership and came right after Xi Jinping unveiled his Made in China 2025 plan in May. The plan was an industrial policy that aimed to make China a world leader in key industries like energy, AI, and biotech over the next ten years. For any of this to happen, the Chinese economy had to be brought under control.
While all this was unfolding the Chinese government launched their largest-ever civil society crackdown that would see the arrest of hundreds of human rights lawyers, many of whom later reported torture via electrocution and forcible drug ingestion. The 709 crackdown — as it would later be known — affected hundreds of families and saw legislation to restrict more than 7000 NGOs.
CCP documents leaked in 2013 revealed that Xi Jinping viewed civil society organisations and talk of universal values as challenges to China’s official ideology. Document Number 9 was a CCP directive leaked by journalist Gao Yu (now in prison) that described ‘seven evil forces’ within China that would internally erode it.
2015 was the start of the realisation of this document, and after purging the military in March, Xi had finally secured his position within the party, and was now willing to expand his purge into all of civil society. This was also when Xi’s personality cult got into full gear, as well as the release of his own book Governance of China (2015). Shops were soon selling plates, medallions and other trinkets with Xi Jinping’s airbrushed face printed on them.
The next few years saw a conflict emerge between Xi and the remnants of the Shanghai Clique, as well as other forces opposed to him in the media and the military.
In the original anti-corruption campaign, Xi enlisted the help of a senior figure called Wang Qishan, who had risen through the ranks as the governor of China’s Construction Bank, the second-largest bank in the world by market capitalization. Wang had befriended Xi when they both worked in labor camps during the Cultural Revolution. Trained under previous economic reformers, he was not only more economically minded than other officials, but also one of Xi’s closest confidants. In recent years, however, a rift has opened between them.
During the coronavirus outbreak, many people have become familiar with the financial outlet Caixin, which is one of the few outlets in China willing to publish stories directly critical or contradictory to CCP policies. Foreign media has praised Caixin in the past for outstanding journalism. However, in China itself, almost all outstanding journalists (like Gao Yu) are in prison. The reason Caixin is able to get away with publishing those articles is because it is controlled by Wang Qishang, who protects the publication with his financial influence.
As bank governor, Wang Qishang facilitated close ties with SEEC Media Group, the parent company of Caixin. Since then, the magazine has largely done his bidding. The reason is that Wang — as an economic reformer — sees the value of posting information as vital to Chinese business interests.
2016 saw a battle between Xi and similar elements in the Chinese media. After the People’s Daily said all state media should be loyal to the party, outspoken real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang criticised this line and responded by saying people should be loyal to the nation and not the party, incurring a sleuth of critical articles from the Xinhua News Agency, the official state-run press agency of China.
Caixin at this time stepped in to defend Ren, publishing interviews from a Shanghai professor who called the National People's Congress a ‘rubber stamp office’ and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (the people’s PCC) a ‘flower vase’.
Shortly after, sources posted an anonymous letter online calling on Xi Jinping to step down because of his incompetence and told him to “watch out for his own safety”. The letter was allegedly posted by a hacker on Watching, a Xinjiang company owned by SEEC and the Alibaba group.
Ren Zhiqiang is a close friend of Wang Qishan and was only able to make such comments because of Wang’s protection. Initially, Xi actually stepped in to defend Ren from the attacks of the state media. But after the publishing of the anonymous letter, it was clear things had gone too far.
Dozens of people were arrested in the response, and the editor of the CCP’s leading intellectual journal, Qiushi, hanged himself in the company building after it was clear the party organs were coming for him next.
The head of the SEEC group was forced to resign, Caixin was banned from publishing for two months, and Tencent was completely banned from online news reporting. Xi and Wang’s relationship soured. It may not be the case that Wang or other leaders were responsible for the letter, but they had seemingly helped create an environment where it could be published.
With his control on the media secure, Xi then turned his attention to the law and the military. It seemed that, unlike the threat from the Bo-Zhou conspirators who wanted to directly usurp power from Xi, this second round of challengers were attempting a ‘soft-coup’ which would limit his power within the party rather than remove him from it.
Xi’s motive was to remove the final elements of the Shanghai Clique from important posts within the government, and replace them with his own loyal supporters. This started with the purging of the justice department in early 2017, and then the arrest of Anbang Insurance CEO. As he was married to one of Deng Xiaoping’s daughters — the man who had taken over after Mao’s death and turned China into a financial powerhouse – this sent the message that even members of political royalty were not safe.
Next came the removal of the alleged ringleader, Sun Zhengcai, a relatively young official who had risen quickly through the ranks after being promoted by senior party elders to become mayor of Chongqing, the same position that Bo Xilai had held. Xi Jinping visited him in 2016 and lauded his ‘great achievements’. These achievements were clearly rather too laudable for Xi, as just a year later he and his confidants were unceremoniously expelled from the party and sentenced to life imprisonment. This later became evident as a way to remove any potential successors before Xi’s 2018 takeover.
Xi then installed his own former aide Chen Min’er as mayor of Chongqing, who — rumour has it — is actually being groomed to take over from Xi in 2022. The theory goes that rather than stay in power forever, the term limit abolition is a way to guarantee his own successor, the other possible candidate being Hu Chunhua, who is Hu Jintao’s choice from the Youth League faction and may be given the role of Premiere.
A few months later Xi purged the military again, reportedly triggered by an assassination attempt in Xinjiang. He imprisoned two leading generals and filled its top ranks with his supporters. One of the generals hanged himself before he could be fully investigated, leading the People’s Daily to warn about ‘selfish officials using suicide to escape justice’. In contrast to the previous conspirators, these ones were expelled and sentenced in a few short weeks. State language was also far more direct this time, directly linking Sun and the generals to Bo Xilai, and saying that they “plotted to usurp the party's leadership and seize state power”.
This was the setting of the stage for Xi’s removal of term limits in early 2018, which was firstly a way to avoid the political conflict of 2012, and secondly, a way to stop the Shanghai Clique or another faction nominating a successor for him.
With the purging of the last of the potential challengers in 2017, and the reshuffling of many leaders in the 2018 reforms, Xi had firmly established his own clique by filling departments with officials who had worked under him in Zhejiang. His clique is currently referred to as the New Zhejiang Army.
The New Zhejiang Army
While Xi had successfully outmanoeuvred the party elders, his bold actions in abolishing term limits seem to have alienated many people who were previously his supporters. During the 2018 reshuffle, Wang Qishan was removed from the head of the anti-corruption campaign and given the role of Vice President (despite him being officially too old). This may seem like a promotion, but in fact, it limited his influence. Li Keiqang, Xi’s Premiere and right-hand man, also distanced himself from Xi and directly contradicted him in his speeches.
They were also further unsettled by the ensuing crackdowns in 2018, a shadow banking crackdown that caused stocks to plummet, another civil society crackdown that shut down trade unions, and a ‘clean up the internet’ campaign that increased censorship, forced the removal of Caixin’s editor, and his forcing of Jack Ma to step down as Alibaba CEO. At the same time, laws came into effect that allowed corrupt officials to be charged with the death sentence, something which has been handed down on many officials since, including one official found with 13 tonnes of gold at his home and $30 billion worth of bribe money in his accounts.
All of this made senior party leaders unhappy. Things reportedly came to a head in the Beidaihe meeting on Hainan Island in August 2018, a closed-off meeting only for the heads of the CCP. According to Japanese and Taiwanese sources, a letter was signed personally to Xi by three senior elders telling him not to move China too far from the course of economic reform, and to scale back some of his state ambitions, specifically Made In China 2025. They also wanted Xi to end the trade war with the US after he had previously chosen to play tough with the Trump administration. Clearly, some compromise was reached at the meeting, as the government then quietly agreed to scale back some of the state expenditures.
Challenges to Xi mounted throughout 2019. During the legislative plenary session, the former finance minister Luo Jiwei openly called Xi’s Made In China plan “a waste of money” and was quickly removed from his party office. Numerous state leaks of CCP documents on China’s repressive Xinjiang policies also seemed to indicate dissension in the ranks, and Deng Xiaoping’s son warned that China should re-examine its priorities.
During the current crisis, Xi has taken the opportunity to imprison former Interpol chief, Meng Hongwei, and Vice Minister of Public Security Sun Lijun, after he was sent to Wuhan to oversee operations. He also removed the deputy minister, and the justice secretary, all of whom worked under Zhou Yongkang, and helped Xi orchestrate the 709 crackdown. Xi has also spent the last few weeks visiting Shanxi province and arresting dozens of officials. This seems to be an attempt to finally remove the influence of the Shanghai faction in the secret police and shows that Xi still fears the same departments will be used against him.
As the coronavirus has unfolded in China, Xi has faced a wave of criticism. He has used the crisis to imprison many of his enemies and expand censorship. Ren Zhiqiang — the tycoon who criticised the party back in 2016 — has gone missing after calling Xi ‘a clown’, showing that Wang Qishang is unable to protect all his friends.
There have been numerous academics and activists who published open letters criticising Xi, and even another anonymous letter from within the party that openly called on Xi to step down. Wang Qishan apparently told Xi to stay away from the spotlight during the crisis, and that instead, Li Keiqiang should take centre stage. The fact that Caixin is still able to publish articles openly critical of Xi, albeit often censored, shows that the erosion of friendship between Xi and Wang may be one of the most significant splits within the party.
What this all means for the future of the party is still difficult to grasp, as the inner workings still remain closed off from public view. However, it appears that while Xi has been successful in consolidating his grip on power, his actions over the last few years have alienated many who previously supported him.
A good historical comparison to understand the current rift is with Mao in the 1950s when Liu Shaoqi was able to limit his influence by criticising him at the thousand cadres conference. Or in the 1990s when Chen Yun was using the media to stop Deng’s opening-up policies. Deng was then able to outmanoeuvre Chen with his televised Southern Tour, but whether Xi can match Deng’s intelligence in pulling off such a daring political move remains to be seen.
In comparison to past leaders, Xi seems to have a much stronger grip on the party, but lacks the capability to actually push through a successful policy agenda. There are worrying signs that the CCP is gearing up for a fourth Taiwan Straits Crisis, as a way to deflect domestic criticism, and it may be that Xi is able to emerge from this crisis even more entrenched. The Beidaihe conference shows a compromise can be reached, and it is possible the old guard is able to limit Xi’s influence and then remove him from power by the time his original term was supposed to expire in 2022.
The next People’s Congress is scheduled to open on the 21st of May this month. Ahead of the meeting, the discipline office has just inspected 13 departments and Zhao Kezhi, Xi’s new secret police head, has said security is of utmost importance for the meeting. After this date, we will have a better idea of how things stand.
I think talk of a coup, or a revolution, is currently wishful thinking. While Xi’s agenda will probably stall, and the economy will continue to decline, I see a very slim chance of him being totally removed from office in the next few years. I remain optimistic that China will eventually reform itself, but we may be in for another decade or two of a declining, nationalistic, and aggressive China until that day finally arrives.
John Martin
Sources:
Hu Jintao took down Chen Liangyu
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2006/09/28/the-harder-they-fall
The Bo Xilai affair
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17673505
Zhou Yongkan coup rumours
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2012-mar-22-la-fg-china-coup-rumors-20120323-story.html
Zhou Yongkan charges
https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/what-state-secrets-did-zhou-yongkang-leak/
Xi Jinping reportedly survived six assassination attempts
https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/just-how-secure-is-xi-jinping-really/
https://www.visiontimes.com/2014/09/04/chinese-president-reportedly-survived-6-assassination-attempts.html
Zhang Yang comitts suicide
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-death-of-zhang-yang-and-chinas-military-purge/
Sun Zhengcai is purged
https://www.economist.com/china/2017/07/20/a-potential-successor-to-xi-jinping-is-purged
Miles Guo said there had been two bomb attempts against Xi in Xinjiang in 2017 directed by PLA officials.
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3817081
Chinese state media said that Sun Zhengcai and others had been plotting a coup attempt
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/chinese-official-xis-anti-corruption-drive-prevented-coup-attempt
Officials plot to overthrow xi jinping
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-41691917
Vaccine scandal purge
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-16/china-s-xi-oversees-purge-of-40-cadres-as-vaccine-fallout-widens
Religion purge
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-45625278
Stock downturn in 2019
https://www.ft.com/content/62f8444c-64dd-11e9-a79d-04f350474d62
Wang Baoming Resigns november 2016
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/brief-seec-media-group-says-wang-boming-resigns-085305493--sector.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly9kdWNrZHVja2dvLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAANmZMYlLg2s8Lenuq_EEGiQo5VyTviYySOMtiWPHtM32oXlDtLF2ehd_Kxg6wdBULm59UYmOWOtSQ9b2fQ4f4QjITq92wj_smpP7tleLU5VMEeVpQUNHCisU1T9VlZdqs61UldMcoePKzAZO9cp1-Ecd9nMPCMYkWK-YMl1ciQIE
Men Hongwei purged
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-51185838
Sun Lijun purged
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/chinas-vice-minister-public-security-arrested-corruption-probe
Splits between Xi and Li were evident in 2016 when their speeches directly contradicted each other.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/discord-between-chinas-top-two-leaders-spills-into-the-open-1469134110
3 Party leaders signed a letter to Xi and split with Li
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3496725
Ren Zhiqiang purged
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3075256/chinese-tycoon-ren-zhiqiang-goes-missing-after-criticising
Open letter submitted within the party calling on Xi to step down
http://news.creaders.net/china/2020/03/21/2204695.html
https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2020/03/24/china-communist-party-members-share-letter-urging-removal-of-xi-jinping/
Deng’s son calls on China to get its priorities right and get back to reform efforts
https://www.ft.com/content/839ccb0c-e439-11e8-8e70-5e22a430c1ad
Luo Jiwei forced to resign after calling MIC and Belt and Road a waste of money
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3006516/xi-jinpings-intolerance-dissent-within-government-heightens
Letter source
http://japan-forward.com/history-repeating-itself-moves-afoot-for-xi-jinpings-ouster/
First officials sentenced to death under Xi in March 2018, just after Xi’s takeover
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/xi-issues-first-death-penalty-in-corruption-crackdown-luliang-zhang-hongsheng-xu-maiyong-26h7zj56c
Chen Liangyu Arrested
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1584736/Shanghai-Communist-Party-boss-jailed.html
The battle of Zhongnanhai
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/13/12/30/n4046003.htm
NGO legislation
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html
The 709 crackdown
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2154278/trial-fire-three-years-crackdown-put-chinas-nascent
Jiang Zemin surprise appearance 2017
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/back-from-the-dead-chinas-internet-goes-wild-over-youthful-jiang-zemin
Fu Zhenghua retires
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3080860/chinas-justice-minister-sheds-communist-party-title
Meng Jianzhu arrested
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3080618/chinas-top-hong-kong-security-officer-faces-corruption-probe
13 tonnes of gold
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10049059/corrupt-chinese-mayor-300million-stash-gold-bars/
HNA CEO death
https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/hna-group-chairmans-sudden-death-stokes-conspiracy-theories/
Xi is grooming Chen Min’er to take over as his successor.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/20/xi-jinping-has-quietly-chosen-his-own-successor/
Discipline inspection and PS Minister saying that security is of utmost importance for the congress session scheduled on May 21st.
https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/60178440/%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E4%B8%A4%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%97%E6%B5%B7%E8%BF%9B%E5%85%A5%E4%B8%A4%E4%BC%9A%E7%AA%97%E5%8F%A3%E6%9C%9F%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%AE%89%E4%BF%9D%E5%85%A8%E9%9D%A2%E5%8D%87%E7%BA%A7
The Xishan society, The China Dream comes to Coal Country
https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/xi039s-039china-dream039-comes-to-coal-country/
In 1998, Li Peng’s son, Li Xioyong was involved in a massive NUS $60 million fraud scandal that caused mass demonstrations.
https://www.economist.com/asia/2002/02/14/something-rotten-in-the-state-of-china
Xi Jinping’s involvement in the Yuanhua corruption scandal
https://www.ft.com/content/b450ebd2-a0d6-11e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0
The veteran’s protests in 2018 were reportedly organised by the Beijing Public Security Bureau as a challenge to Xi.
https://www.economist.com/china/2018/10/27/frequent-protests-by-veterans-alarm-chinas-authorities
Did the same thing in 2016
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/11/protests-outside-chinese-defence-ministry-beijing-at-army-cuts
Zhao Kezhi emphasis on security
https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/60178440/%E7%96%AB%E6%83%85%E4%B8%A4%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%97%E6%B5%B7%E8%BF%9B%E5%85%A5%E4%B8%A4%E4%BC%9A%E7%AA%97%E5%8F%A3%E6%9C%9F%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%AE%89%E4%BF%9D%E5%85%A8%E9%9D%A2%E5%8D%87%E7%BA%A7
Xi Jinping apparently went to Shanxi many times in the last few months and sent Hu Chunhao to Jilin several times to investigate anti party activity
https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/60178277/%E4%BB%8A%E6%97%A5%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E5%B1%B1%E8%A5%BF%E8%A1%8C%E5%8F%97%E7%9E%A9%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E5%85%83%E8%80%81%E5%A7%AC%E9%B9%8F%E9%A3%9E%E4%B9%8B%E5%AD%90%E5%88%91%E6%BB%A1%E8%8E%B7%E9%87%8A%E5%9B%BE
